About My Last . . .

Several people seem - a couple say so - to be philosophy majors. Great. Then you know the rules, and unless you intend to wander into pseudo-intellectual device, that means there are things upon which we have to agree. Gravity, for instance, is a fact. Any opinion that says the pull of gravity is directed in any direction other than toward the center of the earth is special, and requires repair to another domain of discourse.

Someone - Schopenhauer, I think - once pointed out that there's a difference between logic and dialectic processes. Logic, he noted, is the science of pure reason, and is capable of a priori construction. Dialectic, on the other hand, must be a posteriori - it must wait for experience. The trouble with that is that experience may vary from individual to individual or group to group.

Worse (and I think Schopenhauer discussed it), human beings argue "eristically" (I read Schopenhauer in German a long time ago, and that was my translation then), for the pure sake of arguing, in other words - just the competition. They aren't interested in determining fact, only in winning the argument. I'm not one of the latter, incidentally, which means I "flip-flop" sometimes - because logic and reason say I'm wrong.

History, of course, is experience, subject to honest and dishonest - eristic, for instance - error. Among the honest forms of error are those something like what we used to call Type One and Type Two Errors.

Now I've done it. Parenthetically, I need to explain that a Type I Error occurs when one rejects the Null Hypothesis when it is true. An example of the Null Hypothesis is the assumption that a coin will come up heads half the time. A Type II Error happens when one doesn't reject the Null Hypothesis (and, of course, the hypothesis alternative to the Hull is true).

Phew! Anyway, let's say for instance I make an argument that my opposition refutes on the basis of information too limited - there's more proof he (and I, maybe) hasn't considered, in other words. I concede that he's right, making us both wrong. Honest error. Experience will show us how wrong we are. Iraq, in other words (when you're dead, everyone is pretty sure something went wrong).

But logic remains effective even when the subject is being decided dialectically or eristically. Logic, for instance, is the basis for the theory of Type One and Type Two Errors. It's the basis for my observation concerning what death of combatants in war means. More, pure (mathematical) logic is the basis for all rational tactics. In game theory, for instance, it has been shown that in any finite, non-cooperative game (warfare included), there must - HAS to be - a situation where no player has anything to gain by changing his strategy while the other players do not change theirs. The theory is called the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium, and it is based in its entirety on pure logic. It is a fact, something even experience can't change (a coin may come up heads - for instance - fifty, even a hundred or more times in a row; that doesn't change the logic - accepting the Null Hypothesis - of the matter).

Oops again. Now I'm "hoist on my own petard" - again. We're into probability theory - Bayesian, to be exact - and Kip, Tom, and others - will say we're back to experience. Yes and no. Bayes' Theorem and all the rules of probability are derived from pure logic. To reject the answer or answers probability suggests is illogical, in other words.

Months - at least six - before the invasion of Iraq, I said and wrote that it would be a colossal blunder. I said that on the basis of both logic and experience. I did not, as it seems the administration did, expect on the basis of good intentions and god's blessing a miracle. I could, indeed, have been wrong, too; but my error - logically - would have to have been that of erring on the side of caution.

German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel once observed that a risk is a chance you take knowing that failure means you can still recover. A gamble is a chance taken knowing that failure means recovery will be impossible. The decisive factor is whether risk or gamble is worth failure. Was "Iraqi Freedom" worth the risk or gamble? For the United States government? For the military-industrial complex? For the U.S. public? For the dead?

Rommel also said, "Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, and brains saves both." Rommel was a tactician; George W. Bush and his administration aren't. There's no arguing that - dialectically OR eristically.

P.S. Rommel was a brilliant tactician -arguably the greatest of all time. Here are some more things he said - something to consider where our discussion here today is concerned:

"Mortal danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas." (Explains the change in Mr. Bush's approval ratings, maybe?)

"Don't fight a battle if you don't gain anything by winning." (I guess we've been discussing that - "on the side of caution . . .")

"Courage which goes against military expediency is stupidity, or, if it is insisted upon by a commander, irresponsibility." (I've sent this one to the White House and my "representatives" in the U.S. Congress.)

"The best plan is the one made when the battle is over." (Just remember that I'm on record months before.)

"Men are basically smart or dumb and lazy or ambitious. The dumb and ambitious ones are dangerous and I get rid of them. The dumb and lazy ones I give mundane duties. The smart ambitious ones I put on my staff. The smart and lazy ones I make my commanders." (Would that the U.S. public actually had those options; and to imagine we do is illogical in light of experience.)

"One must not judge everyone in the world by his qualities as a soldier: otherwise we should have no civilization." (Not so apropos here - or is it?)

"What was really amazing was the speed with which the Americans adapted themselves to modern warfare. Starting from scratch an army has been crafted in the very minimum of time, which, in equipment, armament and organization of all arms, surpasses anything the world has yet seen." (We're all wondering what happened, aren't we?)